We kicked off a previous article with a dilemma: No matter what we do, “we are already living in an age of crisis” (Commissioner Lenarčič). If we cannot escape the cycle of crisis, should we just throw up our hands and brace for the next wave? Of course not. There are lessons to be learnt, some of which were raised already in previous articles (e.g. on the COVID-19 response and disaster preparedness). We can also see some interesting (and even inspiring) policy trends in crisis management and disaster risk reduction. So, to close out this discussion, we will draw some conclusions about the future of crisis response and how we can invest in resilience in Europe and globally.
First, crisis has fundamentally shaped the policy landscape of Europe (and will continue to do so).
Anyone following the news headlines could easily come to this conclusion. However, if we take this line of thinking a step further, we can see a fundamental shift in policy formulation, with resource reallocation, reprioritisation and integration evident in initiatives that have endured beyond the crises that precipitated them. The COVID-19 crisis exposed Europe’s heavy dependence on external supply chains for critical goods, from pharmaceutical ingredients to semiconductors, alongside the need for more responsive decision making and high levels of coordination. To build on these lessons, the EU created the Health Emergency Preparedness and Response (HERA) because new mechanisms were needed to ensure sufficient preparedness, crisis response and cooperation. Created in response to COVID-19, HERA has proved useful in tackling Mpox, influenza and Ebola.
The security crisis caused by Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, further compounded since January 2025 by shifting US foreign policy under the Trump Administration, has precipitated 2 large-scale, rapid policy shifts. First, the end of cheap Russian gas forced Europe to diversify its energy sources, boost renewables and reconsider nuclear power, while still aiming for a low-carbon transition (N.B: the second pillar of the EU’s Competitiveness Compass addresses this priority). Second, the war ended Europe’s ‘peace dividend’ era. In 2024, Germany’s military budget surpassed €100 billion, and EU-wide defence spending rose dramatically. With US security commitments to Europe in question, self-reliance in defence has become a central policy goal.
Meanwhile, in response to climate-related disasters that have revealed underinvestment in infrastructure adaptation across the EU, we see a refocussing and reprioritisation. While reducing emissions has long been a main focus, European countries are rethinking urban planning, flood defence systems, and disaster preparedness as critical elements of a broader climate adaptation policy framework. The EU Climate Adaptation Strategy (2021), strengthened following devastating floods and wildfires in 2023, is just one example.
We cannot speak about the changing policy landscape without referencing the Letta1 and Draghi2 reports, which will continue to significantly influence European policymaking in the coming years. These reports reflect lessons learnt from recent crises in the way they advocate for deeper integration, regulatory reform and prioritisation of research, innovation, and strategic industrial investment.
To a certain extent, the recent crises have revitalised policymaking, starting with the discourse but also emerging with comprehensive and integrated proposals.
Second, while we see positive change, new prevention and response policy is needed.
A new paradigm demands a new way of making crisis prevention and response policy; in particular:
(1) Building public buy-in. Some of the policy shifts needed, demand a re-prioritisation away from other legitimate concerns. Clear, transparent communication and inclusive decision-making is necessary to build the public consensus and political will to sustain support for ambitious reforms over time. It is possible. Under the REPowerEU plan the public largely accepted higher energy bills as the price of independence from Russian gas, enabling faster adoption of renewables and efficiency measures.
(2) Strengthening all public institutions’ crisis capabilities. Governments must enhance their ability to anticipate, manage, and recover from crises efficiently. This requires institutional learning, cross-sector coordination and speed and flexibility in decision making. Many countries across Europe introduced rapid and flexible procurement policies, innovative track and trace apps and novel economic support programmes during the COVID-19 crisis, this required departments to work in new ways. What is essential now is honest and robust analysis of what worked and what didn’t so that the lessons can be applied across sectors and departments.
(3) Investing for the future. Managing crises and building resilience requires significant financial resources and innovative funding instruments. The key question is, how will these investments be funded? The European Commission is proposing to exclude defence spending from the 3% deficit rule, allowing flexibility in crisis-driven investments. We should also anticipate novel Financing Models, for example the €750 billion COVID-19 Recovery Fund, the first-ever joint EU debt issuance proved that large-scale European borrowing is politically viable. It is also vital to mobilise the private sector: the European Investment Bank (EIB) and national institutions are increasingly using financial instruments to leverage private investment and drag EU savings and pension to Europe.
While hard decisions about funding will need to be made, these approaches should not be seen as a drain on resources, rather they are investments in Europe’s future resilience and competitiveness.
Future returns on investment
In conclusion, investing in resilience is investing in the future. Europe faces an era where crises are not one-off shocks but continuous challenges. Public institutions must invest in engagement with citizens, building institutional capacity and mobilising financial resources to prepare for a more volatile world.
This is not about sunk costs—it is about protecting our present, building resilience, to secure our common future, and maintaining global competitiveness in an increasingly uncertain world.
- E. Letta, The Letta report: Much more than a market (2024): https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/ny3j24sm/much-more-than-a-market-report-by-enrico-letta.pdf ↩︎
- M. Draghi, The Draghi report: A competitiveness strategy for Europe (2024): https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en#paragraph_47059 ↩︎